TECHNICAL
Security Architecture
Encryption Protocol
Lakrion implements the Signal Protocol with PQXDH post-quantum key exchange:
- • PQXDH Key Agreement - Post-Quantum Extended Diffie-Hellman with ML-KEM-768 hybrid encryption
- • Double Ratchet - Per-message forward secrecy with key evolution
- • Sender Keys - Efficient group encryption with E2E guarantees
- • AES-256-GCM - Authenticated encryption for message content
- • Post-Quantum Cryptography - ML-KEM-768 hybrid, active for messages, calls, PTT, and video
- • Deniable Authentication - MAC-based auth that doesn't create proof of authorship
Metadata Protection
Beyond message encryption, we protect communication metadata:
- • Sealed Sender - Server cannot see who sends messages; sender ID is inside the encrypted payload
- • Sender Unlinkability (ESID) - Ephemeral sender IDs prevent linking messages to identities
- • Uniform Message Envelopes - All messages padded to fixed sizes, hiding content type and length
- • Control Camouflage - Typing indicators and read receipts disguised as regular messages
- • Cover Traffic - Self-addressed dummy messages to mask communication patterns. Enabled by default.
- • Timing Obfuscation - Server-side timing is randomized to resist traffic analysis
- • No Contact Graph - We don't store or expose your contact relationships
- • Connection Randomization - Randomize connection patterns to prevent fingerprinting
Post-Compromise Security (PCS)
If a session is compromised, Lakrion automatically recovers security:
- • Automatic PCS - Strong, automatic recovery without user intervention
- • Forced DH Ratchet - Recovery events trigger immediate key rotation
- • Silent Session Burn - Suspicious sessions automatically destroyed and rebuilt
- • Identity Blinding - Identity keys can rotate without breaking sessions
- • Key Aging - Keys auto-expire and are purged on schedule
Dormant Architecture (LDA)
Our novel security architecture protects against zero-click exploits:
- • Code Not Loaded - High-risk subsystems (audio, codecs) completely unloaded until needed
- • Mutual Consent - Both parties must agree before loading call/PTT subsystems
- • Time-Bounded - Active subsystems automatically return to dormant state
- • Exploit Resistance - Pegasus-style attacks can't target code that isn't loaded
Network Privacy
- • Tor Support - Route all traffic through Tor with automatic kill-switch
- • TURN-Only Calls - Voice calls always relayed; your IP never exposed to peers
- • ACK Batching - Three modes to batch acknowledgments and reduce timing leaks
- • Traffic Shaping - Configurable jitter and timing patterns (3 modes)
- • TLS 1.3 - All connections use modern TLS with certificate pinning
Privacy by Default
- • No Phone Number - Create accounts with just an account key
- • Screenshot Blocking - Enabled by default
- • Incognito Keyboard - Disables keyboard learning by default
- • Activity Indicators OFF - Typing, online status, read receipts all off by default
- • Calls OFF - Voice/PTT disabled by default, enable per-contact
- • Per-Chat Controls - Toggle calls, media, and activity per conversation
- • Encrypted Local Storage - Database and media files encrypted on device
Server Architecture
- • 24h Auto-Delete - Undelivered messages purged after 24 hours
- • Minimal Logs - Only operational data; no message content or metadata
- • EU Jurisdiction - Servers in Germany under EU privacy law
- • Cannot Read - E2E encryption means we see only encrypted blobs
- • Cannot Identify Sender - Sealed sender hides who sent each message
Verification
Verify contacts through safety numbers - a unique fingerprint derived from both parties' keys. Compare via QR code in-person or by reading numbers aloud.
Voice Calls
- • E2E Encrypted - Per-session ephemeral keys, ChaCha20-Poly1305
- • IP Protected - All calls routed through TURN relay
- • Opus Codec - High-quality audio with RNNoise suppression
- • Off by Default - Calls only enabled when you explicitly allow them
Audits & Transparency
- • Protocol - Self-published specification (independent audits planned)
- • LDA Specification - Published on Zenodo for technical review
- • Open Source Client - Planned
What We Can't Protect Against
No system is perfect. Encryption doesn't protect against:
- • Device compromise (malware with root access)
- • Screenshots by recipients (we block, but determined attackers can work around)
- • Physical access to unlocked devices
- • Weak device security (no PIN/biometric)
- • Social engineering
- • Compromised contacts forwarding your messages
Security is a chain. We provide the strongest link we can.
Last updated: March 2026